Costa Rica: The Private Commercial Banks and the Agricultural Sector by Graham, Douglas H.
• , 
:,,1., 
COSTA RICA 
Economics and Sociology 
Occasional Paper ~o. 1494 
POLICY TOOLS FOR RURAL FINANCE 
COSTA RICA: 
THE PRIVATE COMMERCIAL BANKS AND THE AGRICULTURAL SECTOR 
by 
Douglas H. Graham 
r Ii 
Rural Finance Program 
The Ohio State University 
and 
Academia de Centroamerica 
September, 1988 

COSTA RICA: THE PRIVATE COMMERCIAL BANKS 
AND THE AGRICULTURAL SECTOR 
Douglas H. Graham* 
During July, 1988, visits to six private commercial banks 
were undertaken, in order to gather first impressions on the role 
of these banks in servicing an agricultural portfolio and to 
explore the likelihood of any future changes that could lead to 
increased attention to a rural clientele. COFISA, INTERFIN, 
Banco de San Jose, Banco de Fomento Agricola, BANEX, and BCT 
comprised the list of banks visited. In addition, officials from 
BANCOOP and FEDECREDITO were interviewed. However, the latter 
two intermediaries will be the subject of a separate report . .!/ 
The comments that follow are impressionistic and are not intended 
to be supported by any extensive documentation. Additional 
quantitative analysis of the agricultural lending activities of 
these banks could be undertaken in future visits. The present 
report merely highlights major issues and the concerns expressed 
by a selected number of private commercial bank officials with 
respect to their role in servicing an agricultural portfolio. 
The report is divided into four sections. The first part 
clarifies the nature of the agricultural activities currently 
serviced by the sample of private banks. The second section 
summarizes the principal constraints faced by these banks in 
attempting to expand their agricultural portfolio. The third 
section identifies potential institutional innovations in order 
to expand this portfolio. The final section addresses some 
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broader issues that USAID and the GOCR may have to face in trying 
to expand the role of the private commercial banks in agricul-
tural ·1ending. 
I. PROFILE OF AGRICULTURAL ACTIVITIES 
Most of the private commercial banks visited reported some 
agricultural loans. COFISA indicated that close to one-half of 
their portfolio is devoted to agriculture. BANEX follows close 
behind. For most of these banks the share of agriculture falls 
in the 1 o to 2 o percent range. The crop 1 in es financed are 
almost all in the non-traditional export area and cover a wide 
range of tropical fruits such as mangos, pineapples, melons, and 
strawberries, along with African palm, poultry, root crops like 
yuca, nuts like macadamia, and specialty foods like palmito 
(hearts of palm). In addition, wood products, coffee, cacao, and 
banana activities as well as the rapidly growing field of cut 
flowers and ornamental plants are funded. In some cases the 
financing is for the agro-processor or the agro-exporter; in 
other cases it is directly for the producers. More detailed 
analysis is needed to separate the number and amount of loans 
that go to farmers as compared to value-added activities (users 
of agricultural raw materials). 
Many of the borrowers, who have businesses other than the 
one being financed, were already bank clients in their other 
connections. Collateral is generally available as well as 
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information on business background and experience relevant for 
the project being financed. Thus the private commercial banks 
are able to evaluate and manage risk in their agricultural 
portfolio, something that the state-owned banks are frequently 
unable to do when they manage their portfolios of loans for 
traditional (particularly non-export) agriculture. Not surpris-
ingly, the private commercial banks avoid the traditional 
portfolio of cattle and basic-grains loans. 
All banks claim that from one-third to one-half of their 
present customers had been clients of the state-owned banks in 
earlier years. This suggests that the growth of the non-tradi-
tional agricultural portfolio in the private commercial banks has 
come not only through new clients, beginning their business for 
the first time (but frequently with businesses in other areas), 
but also through portfolio transfers from the state-owned banks. 
This element of market competition exists for the non-agricul-
tural portfolio as well. Indeed, the private commercial banks 
have captured about one-half of the market share for industrial 
loans. This raises the question of whether these shifts will 
lead to a healthy competitive restructuring within the state-
owned banks or to their collapse into servicing only the less 
attractive and riskier traditional clientele. 
II. CONSTRAINTS TO PORTFOLIO EXPANSION IN AGRICULTURE 
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(1) The major constraint to expa~ding the portfolio of 
loans to agriculture lies in the high cost of funds for the 
private banks. Six-months certificates of deposit and relatea 
instruments must pay between 22 to 26 percent per year. Since 
the private banks are prohibited from mobilizing checking 
accounts (at zero interest) and low-cost passbook savings 
accounts, they must lend out their more expensively-sourced 
funds. This results in much higher loan rates than those charged 
by the state-owned banks. Moreover, the private banks must keep 
10 percent of their liabilities as reserves (encaje legal) and an 
additional 20 to 25 percent for contingency reserves (to replace 
the absence of last-resort rediscount facilities, since only the 
state-owned banks have access to the Central Bank). This leaves 
70 to 75 percent of their mobilized funds available to loan out 
in order to earn interest. To cover these financial costs and 
break even, these banks would have to charge between 29 and 35 
percent on their loans. Even with small operational margins, 
these rates severely limit their competitiveness, particularly in 
view of subsidized state-owned bank credit for many agricultural 
activities. Only non-traditional agricultural enterprises with 
profitable overseas markets are able to pay these rates. 
Traditional agricultural activities are unable to earn a suffi-
cient rate of return to bear this interest cost. This explains 
why the private commercial banks have used mostly donor funds, 
obtained a lower financial cost, for their agricultural lending. 
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( 2) Another factor adding to the cost of funds is the 
continuing crowding out of the private sector by the public 
sector in its issuance of government bonds, in order to cover the 
fiscal deficit. The market pressure that results from the 
expanding issue of public-sector paper creates an upward pressure 
on interest rates. 
( 3) Additional constraints are associated with the bor-
rowers' economic condition. Too rapid a growth of the non-
traditional agricultural portfolio quickly reaches the limits of 
the productive or entrepreneurial capacity available in this 
area. At the same time, international marketing networks are 
difficult and costly to arrange in a quick and secure fashion. 
Expertise and technological know-how for these new ventures are 
also in limited supply. Frequently, these firms are over-
leveraged, with little collateral or debt capacity left to use 
for private-bank financing. 
{4) The long-term nature of much of this portfolio {espe-
cially for macadamia, cacao, fruits) requires loan maturities 
from 5 to 8 years. This does not match the much shorter term 
structure of the banks' liabilities. Hence, the need to secure 
longer-term donor funding, in order to bring this match of asset 
and liability structures into closer balance. 
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(5) To date, special lines of credit through the short-
term FOPEX rediscounting line or the longer-term FODEIN program 
have been used to access working and fixed-capital needs. 
Special USAID funds have been available for specific banks at 
various times in the past and have facilitated the expansion of 
the capital base of selected banks as well as their longer-term 
lending. 
(6) An additional constraint to portfolio expansion in 
agriculture has been the lack of private-bank branches in the 
interior. commercial bank branches are typically set up to 
capture current account deposits and passbook savings, which are 
relatively cheaper sources of funds. Depending on the cir-
cumstances, the funds so mobilized may be transferred, in part, 
for loan activity by other agencies, within a national network. 
The depositor-to-borrower ratio in any commercial bank is at a 
minimum a multiple of 20 to 1 and frequently higher. In short, 
deposit services are essential to make bank branching a profit-
able activity. Furthermore, continued promising deposit behavior 
for selected clients can be the lead into opening up loan 
activity for the same clientele. Without this previously 
established base of local depositors in the interior, it may be 
uneconomic to gather the necessary information to evaluate the 
creditworthiness of potential borrowers in that region. 
Currently, all banking activity carried out with the present 
set of customers is handled through the banks' central offices or 
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a few branches in the suburban city of San Jose. Until private 
commercial banks are given the right to mobilize current account 
deposits and passbook savings, branching will remain un-
profitable. 
(7) A final constraint to an expansion of the portfolio is 
the negative impact of the recent FODEA rescheduling measures for 
the traditional cattle producers and basic grains and other 
farmers. This action inculcated bad credit habits and created an 
added risk to any private bank that might have considered drawing 
into its portfolio an initial small number of traditional 
producers. Furthermore, FODEA created a misleading credit-
worthiness profile in the state-owned banks portfolio, thereby 
erasing past information on loan recovery records. This removal 
of potentially useful client-evaluation information added to the 
risks and costs of any bank that might deal with these clients in 
the future. 
III. CURRENT AND POTENTIAL RISK MANAGEMENT METHODS TO SERVICE AN 
AGRICULTURAL PORTFOLIO 
(1) With the private commercial banks facing more expensive 
sources of funding, their viability demands that they be very 
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cautious in allocating their loan funds. Collateral-based 
financing must dominate, unless an equivalent collateral sub-
stitute is used, in order to manage portfolio risk. Thus, it is 
not surprising to see these banks resorting to much cheaper donor 
sources of funds to package their loans to agriculture. The 
donor sources also allow for a lengthening of the term structure 
of funding for the clients. 
(2) An additional means of managing risk is to finance the 
processors or agro-marketers. This funding gives these firms 
sufficient liquidity to guarantee crop purchases from the 
producers. In some instances, advances are made to the producers 
from these firms which, in turn, have received private-bank 
financing. In the end, a trickle-down chain of credit eventually 
reaches the relevant producers of the non-traditional export 
products. The fact that many of these firms also undertake 
collateral business activity adds to the collateral base and 
reduces risk for private bank financing. 
(3) An interesting new approach is being considered by one 
of the banks interviewed. This would entail making loans 
directly to producers of non-traditional crop lines. The farmers 
would have been preselected by the agro-processor, packager, or 
exporter to whom they sell their crop. The farmer's land would 
be used as collateral. Thus, the major cost- and risk-reducing 
feature of lending would be carried out by the agrobusiness; 
·-
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namely, the creditworthiness evaluation. The agrobusiness would 
also carry out on-site technical assistance for the farmers, in 
order to guarantee quality control, in view of the requirements 
of their international markets. They would also collect the loan 
payments for the private bank, through appropriate deductions 
from the purchase price of the crops. It would presumably be in 
the interests of the agrobusiness to see these suppliers of raw 
materials (i.e. the agricultural producers) adequately financed 
by the bank, in order to guarantee a quality product for the 
foreign market. 
(4) Although it is extremely difficult to imagine sig-
nificant private-bank branching occurring without the authoriza-
tion to mobilize sight and passbook accounts, a donor-based 
strategy could possibly succeed if a project is designed to 
guarantee a critical minimum number of potential beneficiaries 
geographically concentrated in one area. 
This possibility could justify the opening of a branch, in 
order to service loan collection more effectively than what can 
be done from the central off ice in San Jose. Of course, the 
private bank could also offer its limited line of deposit 
services and in time conceivably expand its lending to additional 
clientele. To gain the scale economies necessary to justify the 
opening of a branch (without the appropriate deposit instru-
ments), targeting should be relaxed, in order to ensure a suffi-
ciently large clientele. 
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(5) The promotion of a technical-assistance capacity, 
either within the private banks themselves or within private 
agr6nomo consul ting firms, is another institutional innovation 
that could reduce the risks inherent to ventures in non-tradi-
tional agricultural activity. Pilot projects promoting one 
and/or the other approach can be designed into future USAID 
agricultural loan projects. 
IV. REMAINING ISSUES FOR DONORS AND THE GOCR 
(1) Every private-bank manager with whom we talked ap-
preciated the importance of expanding their agricultural port-
folio, in order to broaden the base of political support for the 
legitimacy of private banks in Costa Rica. This al·so motivates 
them to make donations to the ACORDE-FINCA program, which 
promotes micro enterprises and community-participation efforts, 
such as the small bancos comunales (community banks). This 
suggests that some of the private commercial banks may be willing 
to participate in experiments that increase their capacity to 
serve the rural areas. 
(2) When donor projects have been offered for non-tradi-
tional agricultural activities, a number of private commercial 
banks have responded quickly to the package of incentives 
available. An issue for the future is whether USAID would not be 
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better served by spreading its largess more widely among a larger 
number of private banks than has been characteristic in the past. 
This would broaden the range of institutions that serve agricul-
ture, would create a more competitive base for future growth in 
the area, and would remove any image of discriminatory behavior. 
(3) USAID and Central Bank (BCCR) discussions to explore 
joint efforts to promote private commercial bank branching 
opportunities could prove useful. While it may be possible for 
the Mission to launch a package of incentives to encourage 
limited branching efforts, the BCCR is the regulatory entity 
whose actions could influence this initiative positively or 
negatively. They should be a part of the discussion from the 
beginning. 
(4) The BCCR should also review current operating rules and 
regulations concerning branch management performance, i.e. 
capital adequacy, liquidity, and client exposure ratios as well 
as conflict of interest rules associated with bank ownership and 
bank activity. Tighter rules could prevent future bank failures. 
This regulations should not be used, however, to further restrict 
entry into the market. 
(5) The constant promotion of non-traditional agricultural 
exports may reach market absorption 1 imi ts in the near future, 
especially for tropical fruits and root crops for the limited 
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ethnic markets in the United States. Also, the cut flowers and 
ornamental plants may face countervailing duties from the United 
States due to the export bonus scheme (the CATs) employed in 
Costa Rica to promote these exports. This can be considered to 
be a case of dumping by GATT rules. 
(6) The impressive success of the private commercial banks 
in recent years has come partially at the expense of the state-
owned bank portfolio. This could continue to such an extent that 
the private banks end up with all the good clientele, with rela-
tively good rates of return (and who repay their loans responsib-
ly), while the state-owned banks end up with an "adversely" 
selected portfolio, by default. Hopefully, this possibility will 
spur the state-owned banks to respond competively and to intro-
duce more efficient portfolio-management techniques and a more 
efficient organization for capturing scale and scope economies. 
If this does not happen, and if the political authorities prevent 
the state-owned banks from becoming more efficient, then they 
could collapse into financial-welfare agencies and, in turn, 
cause a political backlash against the private banks. Therefore, 
all effort should be made to support the state-owned banks in 
their drive for greater efficiency and autonomy from political 
intrusion. 
(7) Finally, it would be in the interest of the banking 
authorities and the USAID to learn more about various alternative 
.. 
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expansion paths traced out by the private banks in their penetra-
tion of agricultural markets. Each bank has chosen a particular 
operational style and has put together a partiqular mix of 
institutional links to reach selected producer clientele. It 
would be important to document how each bank has established and 
monitored creditworthiness criteria and has chosen its particular 
mix of agricultural clientele. These different portfolio 
patterns of growth could generate useful lessons for future 
portfolio expansion in agriculture. 
NOTES 
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